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Administrative Law-Adoption of Proposed Decision of Hearing
Officer Without Review of the Record by Final Authority Is Not
Denial of ,Due Process-Appellant, an insurance salesman, was
charged with making misrepresentations to policy-holders in violation of
the California Insurance Code.1 As provided in the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act,2 the case was tried before a hearing officer who prepared
for the Insurance Commissioner a proposed decision setting forth his
findings and recommending that appellant's license be revoked. The
commissioner, without reading the record, adopted in toto the proposed
decision of the hearing officer and revoked the license. The superior court
gave trial de novo and affirmed the ruling. On appeal to the District Court
of Appeals, affirmed.. The adoption of the hearing officer's proposed de-
cision by the commissioner without reviewing the record was not a denial
of due process. Hohreiter v. Garrison, 81 A. C. A. 456 (1947).
It has long been well established that due process requires that a
fair or "full" hearing be accorded by administrative tribunals,3 but the
courts have not found it easy to reduce fair or "full" hearing to a fixed
definition.4 The United States Supreme Court has said that "the one who
decides must hear." 5 However, this does not preclude the "one who
decides" from delegating to subordinates the functions of holding hearings,
preparing reports, and making recommendations, 6 provided the adminis-
trator who makes the final decision does so only after consideration of
the record.7 As a practical matter; of course, the degree of thoroughness
with which the administrator reviews the record often varies with its
size and the burden of his other responsibilities.8 The administrative
procedures of most federal agencies have followed these principles.9 Thus,
the California Administrative Procedure Act, as interpreted by the court
in upholding its constitutionality, is unusual in permitting an agency to
adopt the findings of a hearing officer without reviewing the record.
1. CALIFORNIA INsURANCE CODE § 1731 (Deering, 1937).
2. CALIFORNIA Gov. CODE, tit. 2, c. 5, § 11512 (1945). "The agency itself shall
determine whether the hearing officer is to hear the case alone or whether the agency
itself is to hear the case with the hearing officer."
3. See 42 STAT. 166 (1921), 7 U. S. C. § 211 (1934) ("Whenever after full hearing
upon a complaint made. . . ."), Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468 (1936) ; see Ohio
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 301 U. S. 292 304 (1937) ;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91
(1913).
4. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294, 317
(1933) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 76 (1936) (con-
curring opinion of Brandeis, J.).
5. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
6. Id. at 481.
7. National Labor Relations Board v. Cherry Cotton Mills, 98 F. 2d 444 (1938);
see Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 481 (1936).
8. See A. H. Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administrative
Law, 47 YALE L. REv. 647, 664 (1939). The author argues, with reference to the
Morgan, cases: "No lawyer is naive enough to believe that judges actually read
through the records in the cases before them. Why must the Secretary of Agriculture
be more diligent than the judges?"
9. FEDERAL TRADE CommissIoN, RULES POLICIS AND AcTs, Rule XIV (1943);
1 PIKE & FISCHER AD. LAw (Statutes and Rules) NLRB RULES AND REGULATIONS
8, § 203.35; REP. ATT'y. GEN. Commns. AD. PRoc. 44 (1941).
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This is not made clear by the language of § 11517.10 However, in the
light of earlier California decisions 11 and the legislative history of the
act,12 there can be little doubt that such was the intention of the legis-
lature.
This case represents another step in the modern trend to expedite
administrative procedure. Two problems arise, however, neither of which
is answered satisfactorily by the court. § 1731 of the Insurance Code places
the responsibility for revoking or suspending licenses squarely upon the
Insurance Commissioner.13 If the hearing officer's decision is to be
adopted without question, should he not carry the responsibility for the
final decision rather than the commissioner? Secondly, if the commis-
sioner need not examine the record except when making a different find-
ing and award, what is to determine which cases, if any, he will review?
Can it be that he is to pick and choose at random? Clearly, there was
no denial of due process in the principal case since appellant received a
full trial on all the facts before the superior court. However, had this
not been the case, the court, by a strict application of the rule laid down
in the first Morgan case,14 might well have found that "the one who de-
cides" did not "hear" and thus have held that due process was denied.
Unquestionably, the efficient discharge of administrative responsibility is
a desirable goal. Yet it must not be accomplished at the expense of fair
procedure.
Administrative Law-udicial Review of Constitutional Issues in
Rate Regulation-Plaintiff, a public utility furnishing electric service,
sought to enjoin the enforcement of temporary and permanent rate orders
fixed by the Public Service Commission of New York, alleging that the
rates fixed were confiscatory. Plaintiff contended that review of rate orders
of the Public Service Commission as provided by a certiorari order and
its limitations under the New York Civil Procedure Act' was inadequate
10. CALIFORNIA Gov. CODE, tit. 2, c. 5, § 11517(b) (1945) : "If a contested case is
heard by a hearing officer alone, he shall prepare a proposed decision in such form
that it may be adopted as the decision in the case. A copy of the proposed decision
shall be filed by the agency as a public record. The agency itself may adopt the pro-
posed decision in its entirety, or may reduce the proposed penalty and adopt the bal-
ance of the proposed decision."
11. Helmick v. Industrial Accident Commission, 46 Cal. App. 2d 651, 116 P. 2d
658 (1941) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 42 Cal. App. 2d
192, 108 P. 2d 698 (1940) ; Taylor v. Industrial Accident Commission, 38 Cal. App.
2d 75, 100 P. 2d 511 (1940). These cases all held that the commissioner need not ex-
amine the record unless making a different award from that proposed by the hearing
officer.
12. Report of the Judicial Council of California to the Governor and the Legis-
lature, Tenth Report (December 31, 1944) 24. The report states: "In fact, it is not
realistic to require that the head of an agency or the agency members be thoroughly
familiar with all of the cases which come before the agency." And after recommend-
ing the procedure eventually adopted in § 11517: "This procedure is in line with Cal-
ifornia case law which indicates that when an agency adopts the facts found and the
award recommended by a referee who hears the evidence, the agency need not review
the record, but if different findings and award are made the record must be reviewed."
13. CALIFORNIA INSURANCE CODE § 1731 (Deering, 1937).
14. 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
1. Art. 78, § 1296 (Clevenger, 1947) : "Questions for determination; whet hear-
ing before appellate division. In a proceeding under this article, the questions involv-
ing the merits to be determined upon the hearing are the following only: . . . 6.
Whether there was any competent proof of all facts necessary to be proved in order
to authorize the making of the determination. 7. If there was such proof, whether,
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to determine the constitutional issue raised by the claim of confiscation.
The Court of Appeals of New York decided 2 (three judges dissenting)
that plaintiff was entitled to bring a plenary action in equity so that he
might receive an independent judgment on both law and fact which was
not available under certiorari. Staten Island Edison Corporation v. Maltbie,
et al., 296 N. Y. 374, 73 N. E. 2d 705 (1947).
The particular issues of whether, in rate regulation proceedings, after
confiscation has been alleged, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York has the power under certiorari to make the required consti-
tutional determination and whether a public utility is to be denied access
to an equity action have heretofore been the subject of some speculation 3
but no direct decision. The Court of Appeals of New York has re-
stricted petitioners to certiorari even where rate orders were alleged to
be confiscatory, but the court was dealing with certiorari proceedings al-
ready completed.4 The fact that petitioners had committed themselves
to that mode of review undoubtedly influenced that decision. Moreover,
in affirming such a decision the United States Supreme Court indicated
a belief that under New York procedure an equity action would have
been available had the petitioners so elected before submitting to certiorari.5
That certiorari is the exclusive remedy for reviewing rate orders of the
Public Service Commission contested on constitutional grounds is denied
by other New York cases. 8
Twenty-seven years ago in a situation similar on its facts to the in-
stant case, the United States Supreme Court announced the controversial
rule in the Ben Avon case that an independent determination of both law
and fact was required in judicial review of constitutional questions.
7 If
this rule is applied so that the reviewing court simply weighs the evidence
on the record made before the administrative agency and then reaches an
independent conclusion, delay and duplication are limited; but if the rule
is extended so that the reviewing court initiates a trial de novo and may
upon all the evidence, there was such a preponderance of proof against the existence
of any of those facts that the verdict of a jury, affirming the.existence thereof, ren-
dered in an action in the supreme court triable by a jury, would be set aside by the
court as against the weight of the evidence."
2. On appeal from a judgment for the plaintiff, 270 App. Div. 55, 58 N. Y. S. 2d
818 (1945), which reversed an order dismissing the complaint, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 515
(1945).
3. 9 NEw YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE (1938), PROB-
LEms RELATING TO JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION at 805.
4. People ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 275 N. Y. 357, 9 N. E. 2d
961 (1937).
5. New York ex rel. Consolidated Water Co. v. Maltbie, 303 U. S. 158 (1937).
6. See Matter of New Rochelle Water Co. v. Maltbie, 248 App. Div. 66, 289 N.
Y. S. 388 (1936) ; Matter of Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 211
App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y. S. 599 (1925).
7. Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
This case held that where under state procedure judicial review of rate orders fixed
by the Pennsylvania Public Service Commission was by appeal to a court upon the
record made before the Commission, it was denial of ,due process for the legislature
to provide that the court should be limited to determining whether the conclusions of
fact rested on reasonably sufficient evidnce, where those conclusions were as to facts
upon which a question of constitutionality depended. For discussion and criticism see
Curtis, Judicial Review of Commission Rate Regulationz--The Ohio Valley Case, 34
HARV. L. REv. 862 (1921); Hardman, Judicial Review as a Requirement of Due
Process in Rate Regulation, 30 YALE L. J. 681 (1921). Cases that follow this rule:
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936) ; Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22 (1932). But cf. Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310
U. S. 573, opinion amended, 311 U. S. 614; 311 U. S. 570 (1941).
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base its determination on entirely new or additional evidence,8 the powers
of administrative tribunals are greatly reduced.9 Although the two pos-
sible applications were not to be decided in the instant case,10 New York
has not in the past construed the rule. as necessitating a trial de novo.
Yet even when restricted to a reweighing of the evidence on the ad-
ministrative record, the Ben Avon rule, although never specifically over-
ruled, may have been further narrowed so as to comprehend only this
situation where confiscation is alleged against a rate order fixed for a
public utility. 1 However, it now seems likely that the rule will continue
to be applied at least within these circumscribed limits, particularly since
there is some indication that the Administrative Procedure Act 2 will
broaden the general scope of judicial review of administrative findings.' 3
If such a trend is established, without opening the door to the trial de
novo possibility, the New York legislature may well find it advisable
explicitly to broaden the scope of review under certiorari to satisfy the
constitutional requirements raised by the instant case.14
Administrative Law-judicial Review of Deportation Orders
Under the Administrative Procedure Act-The petitioner, an alien
under order of deportation,' was not yet in custody and was therefore with-
out access to a writ of habeas corpus. He filed a petition with the federal
district court praying for review of the deportation proceedings. § 10 of
8. This doctrine was promulgated by Crowell v. Benson, supra, which was not a
rate case and which arose from the constitutional provision vesting the judicial power
in the judiciary rather than from the due process relied on in the instant case. The
Ben Avon and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. cases, supra, followed the first alternative
of independent conclusions from the record.
9. See Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Deter-
mingations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932).
10. See instant case at 383. But see Brief for Plaintiff, p. 75.
11. E. g., Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., supra (no inde-
pendent determination necessary for review of administrative proration order on oil
production even though confiscation alleged). Neither the majority nor dissenting
opinion cited the Ben Avon or St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. cases, supra.
12. 60 STAT. 243, 5 U. S. C. A. §§ 1001-1011 (Supp. 1946). § 1009(e) states: "So
far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and deter-
mine the meaning or applicability of the terms of agency action. It shall . . . hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . .- con-
trary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity. . . . In making the fore-
going determinations the Court shall review the whole record or such portions thereof
as may be cited by any party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial
error."
13. Legislative intent was to broaden judicial review, Pat McCarran, then Chair-
man of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Improving "Administrative Justice":
Hearings and Evidence; Scope of Judicial Review, 32 A. B. A. J. 827 (Dec. 1946).
The Attorney General stated that it merely declares existing law, 92 CONG. REc. A3151
(May 25, 1946). But Dickinson, emphasizing the mandatory language, has concluded
that judicial review is broadened, Dickinson, Administrative Procedure Act: Scope
and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A. B. A. J. 434 (May 1947).
14. The suggestion that the court in the instant case take on this function was
advanced (Brief for Defendants, p. 76) but rejected (instant case at 384). It was
also previously advanced for New York legislative consideration, but postponed be-
cause of doubt as to whether the United States Supreme Court would continue to
apply the Ben Avon rule, supra, Benjamin, 1 ADMnisTRATI ADjUDIcATIOx IN N. Y.,
343-344 (1942).
1. Petitioner, in this country as a treaty merchant, pleaded guilty to an indictment
charging conspiracy against the federal government. He served a sentence and paid
a fine. A warrant was issued for his arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration and
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the Administrative Procedure Act 2 was alleged as the basis of the court's
jurisdiction. The court denied the review requested, holding, that § 10 is
inapplicabje to the extent that judicial review is limited by statutes, and
that, since the immigration statutes deny the right to judicial review except
for the writ of habeas corpus, no other character of remedy is available
under this section. United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 72 F. Supp.
193 (D. C. Pa., 1947)'.
The legislative background of the Administrative Procedure Act indi-
cates that the court's construction of § 10 is less than consistent with Con-
gressional intent.3 Such a construction, however, is desirable from the
standpoint of efficient prosecution of the administrative functions.4 The
court in applying its view of § 10 to the instant case, determined that in
addition to the conclusive bar which the immigration statutes interpose, to
allow judicial review of a character other than habeas corpus would unduly
hamper the deportation process. These conclusions are open to question.
There is serious doubt that the Immigration Act of 1917 5 restricts review
to the extent that this court supposed. The cases cited to support its
interpretation of that act say nothing about the extent to which the act
limits review, and were decided on other grounds.6 In addition, the Senate
Report on the Immigration Act of 1917 indicates quite clearly that Congress
had no intent, specific or general, as to the manner in which judicial review
of deportation proceedings could be obtained. 7 In that report and in
Naturalization, charging that he had violated his status as a treaty merchant. Hear-
ings were held and on review an order of deportation was entered.
2. 60 STAr. -, 5 U. S. C. A. § 1009 (Supp. 1946). § 10 provides: "Except so
far as statutes preclude review . . . (a) . . . Any person suffering legal wrong
because of any agency action . . . shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. (b)
• .* The form of proceedings shall be any specia" statutory review proceeding .. .
or in the absence . . . thereof any applicable form of legal action. ...
3. See Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, SEN. Doc. No. 248,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, 212, 275, 308, 310-11, 380 (1946). Compare REP. ATT'y. GEN.
Comm. AD. PRoc. 92 and 245, 203 (1941) with the approved draft of the Administrative
Procedure Act, cited in note 2 supra. For a brief discussion of this comparison see
Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. R 368
at 413-4 (1946).
4. See REP. ATT'Y. GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc., op. cit. supra at 91; Beutel, The Prob-
lev; of Reform of Administrative Procedure, 6 FED. BAR Joua. 264, 280-6; Blachly and
Oatman, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 34 GEo. L. J. 407, 426-30 (1946);
GELLH ORN, ADmINxsraTrivE LAW AND CASE COMMrENTS 1 to 34 (1940).
5. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. § 155 (1940).
6. See, e. g., Poliszek v. Doak, 57 F. 2d 430 (App. D. C. 1932); Fafalios v. Doak,
50 F. 2d 640 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 651 (1931); Rash v. Zurbrick,
6 F. Supp. 390 (E. D. Mich. 1934) ; Darabi v. Northrup, 54 F. 2d 70 (C. C. A. 6th
1931) ; In re Ban, 21 F. 2d 1009 (S. D. N. Y. 1927).
7. SEN. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 2, Misc. ii, p. 16 (1916). In dis-
cussing the provision for administrative finality the committee said, ". . . while new
in this particular location, is not new in the law, the courts having repeatedly held
that . . . the decision of the administrative officers is final . . . Japanese Imnmi-
grant Case, 189 U. S. 86 (1903) ." In the case referred to it was held that in habeas
corpus proceedings a court could inquire into the deportation process to the extent of
determining whether or not there was a fair hearing, notwithstanding that there was
no provision for a hearing in the statute. This Senate report put Congressional ap-
proval on that view. However, it had been previously held that deportation matters
were exclusively the province of Congress. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279
(1903); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1892), and cases cited
therein. Thus, patently, Congress allowed judicial participation in an area in which
it could have excluded it. For a brief discussion of this point see FRuND, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 240-1 (1928).
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subsequent decisions 8 under the immigration statutes it is indicated that
the scope 9 of judicial inquiry into deportation proceedings was to be nar-
rowly circumscribed, but there is nothing in the report or the decisions
to indicate an intent to restrict the character of judicial remedy in which
that limited scope of inquiry could be exercised.10 That habeas corpus has
been the sole means of review is thus the result of a procedural tech-
nicality and is not attributable to legislative mandate.11
But would granting of this review interfere with the administrative
process unjustifiably? The court's fears on this score were groundless.
Under its construction of § 10, as being inapplicable to the extent that
statutes limit review, no impairment of the deportation process would
result from allowing judicial review of a character other than habeas
corpus, since the scope of judicial inquiry could not be enlarged beyond
the limitations imposed by the immigration act. In a proper case the alien
will ultimately have his judicial remedy for wrongful administrative action.
It would be more consonant with our philosophy of personal liberty as a
natural right to make the remedy available to the injured party without
first depriving him of his liberty.
1 2
Bankruptcy-Interest on Tax Claims Does Not Accrue in Bank-
ruptcy-An involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed in 1939. The
United States and the State of New York filed tax claims. Turnover
litigation ensued, resulting in a settlement in 1946. The tax claims with
interest thereon to the date of payment plus administration expenses would
have exceeded the estate prior to the increase in assets resulting from the
turnover settlement. The referee ordered payment of the tax claims with
interest to the date of payment. On petition for review the court reversed
the referee's order and held that interest accrued only to the date of the
filing of the petition. In re Union Fabrics, Inc., 72 F. Supp.-(S. D. N. Y.
1947).
This decision overrules an anomalous rule of law announced by the
court in In re Kallak.3 In that case § 64 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act
of 18982 influenced the court to hold that tax claims could not be
8. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Jelic v. Director of Immigration, 106 F. 2d 14
(C. C. A. 2d 1939) ; The Washington, 19 F. Supp. 719 (S. D. N. Y. 1937) ; United
States ex rel. Cerami v. Uhl, 9 F. Supp. 887 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), -revd. on other
grounds, 18 F. 2d 698 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
9. GELLHORN, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMM-ENTS, 790 (1940).
10. For an indication that Congress knew the formula to preclude judicial review
where it so desired, see the language of the Economy Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 9 (1933),
38 U. S. C. § 705 (1940), as interpreted in Mroch v. United States, 88 F. 2d 888
(1937).
11. Note 9 supra. In three of the cases cited the court disposed of the case by
merely citing the principle of equity that no resort may be had to equity where there
exists an adequate remedy at law, such as habeas corpus. In the other cases the
relief asked for was denied on similar technical grounds.
12. In order to have access to a writ of habeas corpus the petitioner must at the
time of his petition be restrained of his liberty. See, e. g., In re Esselborn, 8 Fed. 904
(C. C. N. Y. 1881) ; Rosenbaum v. Board of Sup'rs., 28 Fed. 223, 225 (C. C. A. Cal.
1886), affirmead, 120 U. S. 450 (1886).
1. 147 Fed. 276 (D. N. D. 1906).
2. 30 STAT. 544, 563 (1898). "The court shall order the trustee to pay all taxes
legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district,
or municipality in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors. .... "
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treated as ordinary unsecured claims, and that interest thereon accrued
to the date of payment. The general rule is that the accrual of interest
on unsecured claims is suspended as of the date of bankruptcy,3 but as
to tax claims the rule of the Kallak case has been followed either with-
out discussion,4 or with recognition that it is both unjust and unsound. 5
As a result, tax claims benefited at the expense of other unsecured
claims by the delay incident to liquidation. The ever-accruing interest
operated as a deterrent to the presentation of possibly meritorious defenses
to tax claims and minified the results of successful litigation waged by
the trustee to enhance the estate.6 With increasing taxes and the high
interest rates allowed thereon,7 the assets for distribution in many small
estates were entirely exhausted upon the payment of tax claims, leaving
nothing for general unsecured creditors who had often furnished the
wherewithal for the payment of tax claims.
Amendments to the original Bankruptcy Act afford justification for
treating tax claims on the same basis as other unsecured claims. In 1926
tax claims were relegated from first to sixth priority.8  The Chandler Act
not only eliminated the reason for the Kallak decision,9 the sui generis
designation of tax claims, but also required that tax claims be filed and
proved in the same manner as all other claims.10 It might be argued
that Congress, in reenacting § 57 (j) 11 without substantial change, adopted
prior judicial construction of that section.'2  It is submitted that Con-
gressional silence is significant but not decisive. 13 Reenactment should not,
3. Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U. S. 339 (1911). 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §63.16
(14th ed. 1940).
4. U. S. v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304 (1924) ; In re Beardsley & Wolcott Mfg. Co.,
82 F. 2d 239 (C. C. A. 2d 1936) ; In re Clark Realty Co., 253 Fed 938 (C. C. A. 7th
1918).
5. Davie v. Green, 133 F. 2d 451, 453 (C. C. A. 1st 1943) ; Matter of Dorsey, 46
Am. B. R. (N. s.) 146, 147 (W. D. Wash. 1940) ; Matter of D. 0. Summers Co., 45
Am. B. R. (N. s.) 123, 128 (Ref. Ohio 1939).
6. Instant case at -. Litigation over a period of six years resulted in an increase
of $30,000 to the estate. Interest on the tax claims, if allowed to date of payment,
would have increased the tax claims by 48%.
7. United States v. Childs, 266 U. S. 304 (1924) (12% per annum) ; Unemploy-
ment Reserves Comm. of California v. Meilink, 116 F. 2d 330 (C. C. A. 9th 1940)
(12% per annum) ; Matter of Scheidt Bros., 177 Fed. 599 (S. D. Ohio (1908) (15%
per annum). Cf. People of State of New York v. Jersowit, 263 U. S. 493 (1924)
(6% per annum); Matter of Pressed Steel Car Co., 100 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A. 3rd
1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 648 (1939) (6% per annum).
8. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 104(a) (1940).
9. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 104(a) (1940). See note 2
supra for the eliminated provision.
10. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. § 93(n) (1940). "Except as
otherwise provided in this Act, all claims provable under this Act including all claims
of the United States and of any state or subdivision thereof shall be proved and filed
in the manner provided in this section. . ....
11. 30 STAT. 560 (1898), as amended, 52 STAT. 867 (1938), 11 U. S. C. §93(j)
(1940). "Debts owing to the United States, or any state or subdivision thereof shall
not be allowed, except for the amount of the pecuniary loss sustained by the act,
transaction, or proceeding out of which the penalty of forfeiture arose, with reason-
able and actual costs occasioned thereby and such interest as may have accrued
thereon according to law." In the 1898 Act this section read, "Debts owing to the
United States, State, County, district or municipality. . .
12. For a statement and discussion of the re-enactment rule see SUTHERLAND,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS § 5109 (3rd ed. 1943).
13. In Matter of D. 0. Summers Co., 45 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 123 (Ref. Ohio 1939),
Referee Freibolin, one of the principal draftsmen of the Chandler Act, made no men-
tion of any Congressional consideration of the problem.
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of itself, constitute an impediment to a re-examination of the cases and the
reaching of a contrary construction.14 The reenactment of § 57 (j) cre-
ated, at most, an ambiguous situation 15 which the court properly resolved
so as to reach a just result and dispose of an admittedly unsound rule.
Constitutional Law-Comment Upon Accused's Failure to Tes-
tify Does Not Violate 14th Amendment-Appellant was convicted of
murder in the Superior Court of California. He admitted former convic-
tions charged against him in the information and thus barred allusion to
them during trial.1 Had he taken the stand in his own defense, these
prior crimes could have been used to impeach his credibility.2  He did
not testify. With express authority from the California Constitution 8 and
penal code,4 the district attorney and court commented to the jury upon
the fact that the accused had failed to explain away adverse testimony.
On appeal to the Supreme Court the conviction was affirmed (four jus-
tices dissenting) ; the Court ruling that these provisions of the California
Constitution did not violate the 14th Amendment. Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 67 Sup. Ct. 1672 (1947).
The majority opinion by Justice Reed and the concurring opinion by
Justice Frankfurter rest on two propositions: (1) assuming the proceed-
ings would violate the Fifth Amendment if practiced in a federal court,5
it does not necessarily follow that they violate the 14th; and (2) appellant
was not denied due process of law. Both points are supported by authority 6
and with Twining v. New Jersey 7 as almost direct precedent the result
is hardly surprising. The case is significant chiefly because of the rather
remarkable dissent of Justice Black.8  The factual distinction 9 between
14. Girouard v. United States, 328 U. S. 61, 69 (1946), 59 HA'Rv. L. Rlv. 623
(1946); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940).
15. In Hammer v. Tuffy, 145 F. 2d 447, 449 (C. C. A. 2d 1944), L. Hand, J., in
discussing the problem, concluded that since the passage of the Chandler Act the ques-
tion must be regarded as an open one. Note that if an appeal is taken from the de-
cision in the instant case, it would be placed before the same court.
1. PENAL CODE OF CAL. (Deering, 1941) § 1025.
2. CAL. CODE OF CIVL PROCEDURE (Deering, 1941) §2051; People v. Adamson,
27 Cal. 2d 478, 494, 165 P. 2d 3 (1946).
3. CAL. CoNsT. Art. I, § 13. "No person shall . . . be compelled, in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself . . . but in any criminal case whether the
defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evi-
dence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
4. PENAL CODE OF CAL. (Deering, 1941) § 1323.
5. See State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W. 116 (1936) ; Note, 104 A. L. R.
478 (1936) ; Note, 22 CORN. L. Q. 392 (1937). But see State v. Baker, 53 A. 2d 53
(Vt. 1947). For arguments generally as to the advisability and constitutionality of
such comment see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of the Accused to Testify, 31 MIcE1.
L. REv. 40 (1932) and Bruce, The Riqht to Comment on the Failure of the Accused
to Testify, 31 Micir. L. REv. 226 (1932).
6. As to the first proposition see note 16 infra. As to the second see Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
7. 211 U. S. 78 (1908). Except for the distinction noted in note 8 infra the case
is on all fours with the instant decision.
8. Instant case at 1684. Justice Douglas joined in Justice Black's dissent. Justices
Murphy and Rutledge in a separate dissenting opinion agreed that the 14th Amend-
ment made the first eight applicable against state action, but would go even further.
9. It does not appear that Twining had suffered any previous convictions which
might deter him from testifying. The inference of guilt was thus much stronger
there than in the instant case. Justice Frankfurter dismissed the variance as of rela-
tively little importance. Others have considered the accused's possible fear of cross-
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the instant case and Twining v. New Jersey might possibly have permitted
a contrary result on the basis of denial of due process.10 Justice Black, how-
ever, chose to dissent on a broader ground. Adopting the assumption of
the majority that the proceedings would infringe the Fifth Amendment, if
applicable, he argues that they must then violate the 14th. In a vigorous
attack on the Court's time-honored " natural law method of interpreta-
tion ' of the 14th Amendment he contends that it was the intent of Con-
gress when passing that amendment to guarantee the privileges of the
Bill of Rights against abridgment by state action 13 and that the Court
should by giving effect to that intent cease roaming ". . . at will in the
limitless area of their own beliefs as to reasonableness .... " 14
The contention is not new,15 but it has been specifically rejected previ-
ously in a long line of cases.16 Despite the first-blush appeal of strict Court
subservience to the Constitution, Justice Black's argument will not stand
up under practical examination. It leads to two possible conclusions: (1)
strict application of the first eight amendments to the states, or (2) the
necessity of construing those amendments to such an extent that they
become almost meaningless. 17 Adoption of the first alternative might very
examination more vital. Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of the Accused to Testify, 31
MicH. L. REv. 40, 57 (1932) ; 9 PRoc. Am. LAw INsT. 202-218 (1931) ; 56 A. B. A.
REP. 137-152 (1931).
10. Appellant was clearly faced with a dilemma at the trial. He could testify and
thereby have his previous criminal record brought to the jury's attention; or he could
remain silent and have that silence commented upon by the district attorney as an
inference of guilt. Either course of conduct would thus be highly prejudicial. Analogy
to an extorted confession is perhaps not too tenuous. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S.
228 (1940) reversed a conviction on the ground that a coerced confession was a denial
of due process even though no physical violence was used.
11. Justice Black reviews the development of this theory. Instant case, pp. 1690,
1691.
12. Justice Cardozo has referred to due process as including only . . the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325
(1937).
13. Horace E. Flack in his historical study THE ADOITION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1908) agrees with Justice Black in so far as the House (pp. 81, 82)
and Senate (p. 94) are concerned. He finds the evidence less compelling in the case
of the ratifying states (p. 208).
14. Instant case, p. 1696.
15. Justice Black has shown similar leanings in the past. Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227, 235 n. 8 (1940).
16. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 92 (1875) (jury trial in civil cases-Sev-
enth Amendment); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 538 (1884) (information in-
stead of indictment in capital offenses-Fifth Amendment) ; Presser v. Illinois, 116
U. S. 252, 265 (1886) (right to bear arms-Second Amendment) ; In re Kemmler, 136
U. S. 436, 448 (1890), O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 332 (1892) (cruel and un-
usual punishment-Eighth Amendment) ; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 262 (1904)
(deposition in criminal trial when witness not dead or insane-Sixth Amendment) ;
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 93, 99 (1908) (self-incrimination-Fifth Amend-
ment); Palko v. Connecticut, 309 U. S. 319, 323 (1937) (double jeopardy-Fifth
Amendment).
17. For an interesting example of the unfortunate result developing from an early
attempt to apply the Bill of Rights to newly acquired territories and at the same time
preserve local methods in the administration of the criminal law see Hawaii v. Man-
kichi, 190 U. S. 197, 217 (1903). 'We would go even further, and say that most, if
not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of the Constitu-
tion were intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but we place our decision
of this case upon the ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case
[trial by jury and the use of the information] are not fundamental in their nature but
concern merely a method of procedure . . ' (italics supplied).
See Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138, 155 (1904). Justice Harlan, dissenting
from a decision following Hawaii v. Mankichi, said "It is, I submit, so obviously in-
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well invalidate a large number of current state practices 18 and would tend
to stifle reform in the administration of the law.19 Adoption of the sec-
ond method of application makes the standard once again the conscience
of the Court. It would seem more expedient that in exercising their opin-
ions on what is or is not due process the judges be left, as in the past,
unfetter with the necessity of "interpreting" the Bill of Rights in their
effort to reach a desirable result.
Constitutional Law-State Tax on Net Income of Foreign Cor-
poration Engaged Solely in Interstate Commerce-A Missouri motor
freight carrier engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and neither
commercially domiciled nor possessed of appreciable, property in Connecti-
cut, was assessed on that portion of its net income originating in Connecti-
cut.' The Superior Court of Connecticut recently declared the tax stat-
ute applicable to petitioning carrier; therefore unconstitutional as a viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause.2 Spector Motor Service v. Walsh, CCH
CORP. TAx SERV. (Conn.) f 10,006 (1947).
Interstate commerce once enjoyed complete immunity from state taxa-
tion,3 but the Supreme Court has in many subsequent decisions recognized
the right of states to tax local activities of interstate enterprises for the
purpose of exacting from this commerce its fair share of the increasing
burden of local government whose protection and facilities it enjoys,4 while
consistent with the Constitution that I cannot regard the judgment of the court other-
wise than as an amendment of that instrument by judicial construction when a different
mode of amendment is expressly provided for."
18. Use of the information in capital offenses: 4 REv. STAT. OF WASH. ANN.
§ 2024 (Remington, 1932); GEN. STAT. OF KAN. (1935) c. 62, §§ 801-805. Double
jeopardy-state appeals in criminal trials: IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) tit. 19, § 2704(5) ;
IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, C. 23, §§ 9-2304, 9-2305 (Bums, 1933). Deposition of absent
Witnesses not dead or insane: PENAL CODE OF CAL. § 686 (Deering, 1941), People v.
Nelson, 85 Cal. 421, 426, 427 (1890) ; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) tit. 105, c. 48, State
v. Vance, 38 Utah 1, 25 (1910). Trial by a jury of twelve in all criminal cases:
OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, § 21; LA. CODE OF C im. LAW AND PRoc. ANN. Art. 339 (Dart,
1943). The above statutes and cases are cited only by way of example both as to the
number of practices probably repugnant to the first eight amendments and as to the
states in which they are used. For a summary of citations as of 1930 see the commen-
taries on the following pages of the CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE as promulgated by
the American Law Institute: depositions from unavailable witnesses, pp. 303-308; the
use of the information, pp. 414-431; state appeals in criminal cases, pp. 1203-1221.
19. The CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ibid. advocates: (1) the use of the in-
formation, § 113; (2) depositions from witnesses, § 53; (3) state appeals, § 428.
1. Litigation began in 1942. Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 47 F. Supp.
671 (D. Conn. 1942). The court construed the Connecticut Corporation Business Tax
Act, GEN. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1935) § 416c et seq., as inapplicable to the plaintiff in
order to avoid declaring it unconsitutional in the light of existing law. In Spector
Motor Service v. Walsh, 139 F. 2d 809 (C. C. A. 2d 1943), this decision was reversed
and the statute declared applicable to plaintiff but not repugnant to the Commerce
Clause in spite of an unbroken line of decisions to the contrary. On further appeal,
the Supreme Court declined to decide the constitutionality of the statute until it had
been interpreted by the courts of the state. Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin,
323 U. S. 101 (1944). Some thirty states With similar statutes eagerly await the out-
come of another appeal to the Supreme Court. LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 4, 1947,
p. 1.
2. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, § 8.
3. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851) ; Case of State Freight
Tax, 18 Wall. 232 (U. S. 1873) ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196
(1885).
4. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 254 (1938).
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eliminating its tax advantage over competing local industry. Accordingly,
a state may tax property located within the state whether owned by a
domestic or foreign corporation engaged in interstate business.5 Gross re-
ceipts apportioned to business transacted within the state by foreign cor-
porations have long been subject to state tax,6 including those on sales
and use of articles produced in other states.7 States exercise the power
to levy on net income derived from business transactions of foreign cor-
porations within the state,s or on the entire net income of domestic cor-
porations even if derived from interstate commerce.9 License, registration
fees, and gasoline taxes are of universal application."0 However, certain
necessary safeguards have b~en maintained. Wherever a state has sought
to impose a discriminatory burden portending competitive advantage for
local interests,1 ' or to reach property subject to the taxing jurisdiction of
other states,12 the Court has consistently denied it the right. Unappor-
tioned gross receipts taxation has been repeatedly condemned. 13 Most im-
portant to the instant case, the Court has struck down levies imposed upon
an exclusively interstate business. No tax upon the net income of a for-
eign corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce has ever been
sustained.'
4
Although the Court has couched its decisions in rules of law and
abstract learning, the compelling reason for condemning such taxes is the
5. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 (1897); cf. Adams Express
v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185 (1897) (Upheld tax on gross receipts in lieu of a reasonable
ad valorem property tax) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920) (Tax on the income
from property owned by a non-resident). Compare Wheeling Steel v. Fox, 298 U. S.
193 (1936), with Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934).
6. These taxes have been sustained as threatening no multiple burden when fairly
apportioned. Illinois Central R. R. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157 (1940). Frequently they
have also been justified on a local incidence theory. Indiana v. Wood Preserving
Corp., 313 U. S. 62 (1941) ; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 217 (1891).
7. For sales tax see McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33 (1940). For
use tax see Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937).
8. This tax must be apportioned to the business done within the state but may be
measured by that part of the interstate business income which is justly attributable to
that business. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920).
This seems reasonable only when applied to a situation where the business is primarily
manufacturing products for sale outside the state. Cf. Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State
Tax Comm'n, 266 U. S. 271 (1924) (Tax on net income of local activity of foreign
corporation as determined by ratio of local assets to total assets).
9. U. S. Glue Corp. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918) (A domestic
corporation was subject to a tax upon its entire net income even though part of that
income arose from interstate commerce). In New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300
U. S. 308 (1937), that part of a resident's net income which was derived from activi-
ties wholly within another state was recognized as a valid subject of a tax by the state
of residence. Cf. Peck v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (1918). But see Hans Rees' Sons v.
North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 126 (1931).
10. Dixie Ohio Co. v. Comm'n, 306 U. S. 72 (1939) ; Interstate Busses Corp. v.
Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1928).
11. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 (1940) ; McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, 309 U. S. 176 (1940).
12. Lockhart, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxation, 57 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1943).
13. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434 (1939), based on the lead-
ing case of Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307 (1938), which condemned unappor-
tioned gross receipts tax unequivocably as raising danger of multiple burden of taxation.
See excellent discussion of the problem by Mr. Justice Rutledge concurring in Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249 (1946).
14. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass., 268 U. S. 203 (1925) (Foreign corpora-
tion with mills in several states but only a sales office in the state attempting to levy
the tax). Where, as in the instant case, the corporation had obtained but had not ex-
ercised a state franchise, the Court held that an insufficient factor to subject it to the
proposed tax. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555 (1925) ; Anglo-Chilean
Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U. S. 218 (1933).
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potential impediment of multiple taxation to the free flow of national com-
merce. The instant case exemplifies this. The base of the proposed tax
is, under the existing status of the law as to net income, subject to the
levies of more than one state. Under the authority of United States Glue
Co. v. Town of Oak Creek,15 and supporting decisions, the plaintiff's entire
net income, which necessarily includes that portion taxed here, is subject
to tax by the state of domicile.1 6 Thus even fairly apportioned net income
taxes would appear to be comparable to unapportioned gross receipts
taxes, and equally objectionable. 17 The practical impossibility of judicial
supervision over apportionment should prove a further deterrent. Also
the net income from that business which originates in Connecticut is de-
rived not from the fact of origin but from service performed in hauling
goods from Connecticut shippers over highways of other states.'8 The
only real justification for this tax is the exaction from plaintiff of its fair
share of the burden, since the absence of competition with local commerce
precludes the existence of any competitive advantage. 19 Resort to those
taxes presently applicable to interstate transportation would appear to be
a reasonably adequate method of achieving this result. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter pointed out recently, "Because the greater or more threatening
burden of a direct tax on commerce is coupled with the lesser need to a state
of a particular source of revenue, attempts at such taxation have always
been more carefully scrutinized and more consistently resisted .... , 20
Corporations-Minority Stockholders' Remedy for Non-Disclo-
sure in Redemption and Dissolution Proceedings-Three classes of
stock, preferred, Class A common and Class B common had been issued
by an operating subsidiary in which defendant corporation was majority
shareholder holding 67% of the Class A stock outstanding and in 1943
about 80% of the Class B. Class A had an annual dividend twice as
great as Class B.' On dissolution, each share of Class A was entitled to
twice as much as each share of Class B. Each share of Class A was
convertible into one of Class B at the holder's option. The Class A was
redeemable, at the option of the directors, upon 60 days notice at $60 per
share plus accrued dividends. In order to obtain for itself the benefits
of the increase in value of the subsidiary's main asset (tobacco), unknown
15. Supra, note 9.
16. The theory advanced to render such a tax valid is that the net income has no
longer any connection with the interstate commerce from which it arose but instead
has become a part of the general mass of property located within the state.
17. There is a distinction however in that net income can only be subject to
double taxation while gross receipts are potentially subject to even more levies. Never-
theless both result in a heavier burden on interstate commerce than that borne by local
commerce, which is the ultimate test of constitutionality.
18. Of the considerable mileage on plaintiff's entire route, only a small percentage
lies in Connecticut. The portion of the entire interstate operation which is carried
on in Connecticut contributes relatively little of the service which results in that net
income which that state seeks to tax.
19. For an example of a situation where relative competitive advantage was the
controlling factor in the decision, see Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., supra, note 7.
20. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U. S. 249, 253 (1946).
1. The Class A stock was entitled to an annual cumulative dividend of $3.20 per
share as against $1.60 per share for the Class B. If further funds were made avail-
able for dividends by the board of directors, the Class A stock and the Class B stock
were to share equally.
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to most of the Class A holders,2 the defendant corporation caused the sub-
sidiary's directors to redeem the Class A stock, meanwhile converting its
own Class A to Class B. This was shortly followed by a liquidation of
the subsidiary whereby most of the tobacco and the subsidiary's assets
were sold. The defendant received what remained after the payment of
the preferred stockholders and the other Class B holders. Plaintiff, for
himself and the other Class A stockholders, sued the parent to recover
the difference between the redemption and the dissolution prices of the
Class A shares.3  The bill was dismissed,4 but on appeal, the court held
that the bill stated a cause of action against the parent for breach of the
duty owed by the defendant-controlled directorate to the stockholders. Zahn
v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (C. C. A. 3d 1947).
Although the facts of this case are unique, in holding that a "fiduciary
relationship" may exist between majority and minority stockholders, the
court was supported by substantial authority., However, the breach of
duty did not result merely from the exercise of the redemption and dis-
solution provisions, as the court indicated, but rather resulted from non-
disclosure to the stockholders at the time of redemption of the great in-
crease in value of the subsidiary's tobacco. Generally, in the absence of
such special knowledge as the directors and the defendant possessed, a
redemption provision may properly benefit one class of shareholders as
against another 6 as an exercise of a contractual power.7  The fact that
such benefit occurred is not, in itself, sufficient to permit recovery. Thus
the "fiduciary relationship" invoked by the Court is inapplicable here. Nor
2. Axton-Fisher (the subsidiary) possessed leaf tobacco which had cost it about
$6,361,981. During the war, the value of this tobacco increased enormously, and by
the spring of 1943, was worth about $20,000,000. Since the tobacco was carried on
the books at the original cost, an inspection of the books would not have revealed the
appreciation in value.
3. The redemption value of the Class A stock, including accrued dividends, was
$80.80. On dissolution, had he continued to hold Class A stock instead of turning it
in for redemption, each shareholder would have been entitled to $240 per share. Some
of the Class A stock was still outstanding at the time of the suit, in which case the
holders of such shares were seeking the full $240.
4. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 63 F. Supp. 243 (D. Del. 1945), 41 Ir. L. Rnv.
122 (1946).
5. Other factual situations where the relationship has been applied may be found
in: Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 487 (1919); Jones v. Missouri-
Edison Electric'Co., 144 Fed. 765, 771 (C. C. A. 8th 1906) ; Lebold v. Inland Steel
Co., 125 F. 2d 369, 372 (C. C. A. 7th 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 675 (1942) ; Singer
v. Carlisle, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 172 (1940), aff'd, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 320 (App. Div., 1st Dep't
1941).
6. See Taylor v. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., 295 Ky. 226, 231, 173 S. W. 2d 377,
379 (1943) (involving the same stock provisions) where the court said, "Manifestly,
it was very much to the interest of the holders of Class B stock to have all these
priorities, obligations and restrictions on and conditional joint control of the manage-
ment eliminated. A substantial advantage was given to and acquired by the Class B
shareholders by the resolution definitely and unqualifiedly calling Class A stock for .
redemption. That being true, it was vested and fixed, so the directors could not with-
draw or cancel or modify their action to the prejudice or detriment of Class B stock-
holders." See also Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of Its Own
Shares, 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 697, 725 (1941).
7. "The provision relating to the redemption of preferred stock inserted in the
articles of incorporation and in the stock certificates was within the terms of the
statute and each stockholder, by his purchase and acceptance of stock, assented to such
provision and became bound thereby as a part of a valid and enforceable contract be-
tween himself and the corporation." Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 183 Fed.
133, 143 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1910). See also Fox v. Johnson & Wimsatt, Inc., 127 F.
2d 729, 734 (App. D. C. 1942) ; Fayette Realty & Finance Co. v. Commonwealth, 229
Ky. 556, 562, 17 S. W. 2d 722, 724 (1929) ; Sterling v. H. F. Watson Co., 241 Pa.
105, 110, 88 Atl. 297, 298 (1913).
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does it appear that the mere dissolution of the subsidiary was the impor-
tant factor in determining whether there was a cause of action against the
defendant. Even without the exercise of the dissolution provision, it is
apparent that defendant, as practically the sole holder of Class B stock,
would have benefited a great deal merely from increased dividends after
calling in the Class A shares.8 Had disclosure been made, on the facts
of this case, dissolution of the subsidiary could have properly been car-
ried out.9
Assuming that disclosure had been made at the time of the issuance
of the redemption call, the holders of Class A stock would have been faced
with two choices: (1) to accept the redemption call or (2) to convert to
Class B stock share for share.10 Clearly, the better choice, in view of
the appreciation in value of the tobacco, would have been to convert to
Class B which, although paying smaller dividends than Class A, would
nevertheless be worth more than the redemption price as an interest in
a flourishing corporation. Having no knowledge of the true value of the
tobacco, the Class A holders were unaware that conversion was the in-
telligent choice, and consequently took the redemption price at a loss. It
is apparent that if the defendant had redeemed with full disclosure, the
plaintiff would have been holding Class B stock at the time of dissolu-
tion. Thus the true loss caused by non-disclosure is the difference be-
tween the liquidation value of the Class B stock (had all of the Class A
been converted to Class B) and the redemption value of the Class A stock.
If the greater damages sought by the plaintiff (based on the liquidation
preference of Class A) are awarded, the court is saying, in effect, that
failure to disclose results in a loss of the redemption privilege. Although
plaintiff is clearly entitled to a remedy, such a result is not to be desired,
since the damages demanded exceed the extent of the harm caused by
the non-disclosure.
Criminal Law-Robber Guilty of Murder in First Degree When
Shots Fired by Intended Victim Kill a Third Person-Defendants
drove to a gasoline station. One of the defendants pointed a gun at the
attendant, told him it was a "hold up", and began marching the attendant
toward the building on the premises. The owner of the station was
hidden within the building's doorway and was in possession of a gun.
After the attendant moved off toward the left, a gun battle ensued be-
tween the oWner and the defendants, during which the attendant was
fatally shot. A portion of the trial judge's charge was broad enough to
mean that even if the owner fired the shot which killed the attendant,
8. Even if Transamerica had not received the increased dividends, the prospect of
such an increase, after the appreciation in value of the tobacco became generally known,
would favorably affect the value of the shares of Class B held by Transamerica.
9. Sprecher, The Right of Minority Stockholders to Prevent the Dissolution of a
Profitable Enterprise, 33 Ky. L. J. 150 (1945).
10. By the charter, Class A could be converted to Class B at the holder's option
"at any time prior to the date upon which the same shall have been called for redemp-
tion." [Brief for Appellee, p. 16a.] Plaintiff contended that the Class A stockholders,
under this provision, could not exercise the conversion privilege after the redemption
resolution was adopted. However, as defendant's brief states, it would seem that the
only time a Class A stockholder would desire to convert to Class B would be after
the redemption resolution had been issued. If it could not then be exercised, there
would be little point in having such a provision in the charter, for it would be more
profitable to hold Class A stock in a going concern than Class B in view of the fact
that both had voting privileges.
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defendants would be guilty 1 under the Pennsylvania felony-murder stat-
ute.2  A conviction of murder in the first degree was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, which held that the disputed portion of the charge, as
construed above, was a correct statement of the law. Commonwealth z.
Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 53 A. 2d 736 (1947).
Elsewhere it has been held that where one uses another as a "human
shield", or forces him to go to a place dangerous to his life, resulting in
death from shots fired by a third person, the party who forces the victim
into this position is criminally responsible for the death.3  But where the
victim is an "innocent bystander", and is killed by one shooting in self-
defense,4 or by an officer,5 the courts have not held the aggressor criminally
responsible. Courts rationalize the different results by finding "causation"
in one case and not in the other.6 Such a rationale is valueless in under-
standing the cases, since "cause in fact" exists in both situations. Nor
does it help to call the third party who fires the fatal round an "inde-
pendent intervening cause" in the second case and not in the first.7 The
only factual ground of real distinction is that in the first situation, the
defendant forces the victim into the place of danger; in the second, the
dangerous situation is created around the victim by the defendant, after
the victim arrives at this place, of his own volition. The factual situation
in the instant case falls somewhere between the two. The court, by taking
its analogy to the "human shield" cases allows Pennsylvania's felony-
murder statute to embrace a new set of facts.
Should the two lines of cases be completely merged? While con-
siderations of the present must guide any analysis of those homicides
which courts ought to consider felony-murders, we should also look to
the origin of the felony-murder doctrine. Previously, almost all felonies
1. "All the participants in an attempted robbery are guilty of murder in the first
degree if someone is killed in the course of the perpetration of the first named crime."
[Record, p. 455.] That the trial judge merely forgot to use the wbrds "by the defend-
ants" is shown by other portions of the charge. [Record, pp. 477, 481.]
2. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 4701 (Purdon, 1945). "All murder which shall be
committed in the perpretation of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape,
rolbery, burglary, or kidnapping, shall be murder in the first degree." The word
"murder" rather than "homicide" is used since one who killed in the perpetration of
a felony was guilty of common law murder.
3. Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 564, 55 S. W. 961 (1900); Keaton v.
State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 621, 57 S. W. 1125 (1900) ; Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846,
68 S. W. 2d 100 (1934). See 1 HALE P. C. 431, 432 (1736), for causing exposure to
danger as "proximate cause" of death generally.
4. Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 18 N. E. 338 (1888) ; Commonwealth v. Moore,
121 Ky. 97, 88 S. W. 1085 (1905) ; cf. State v. Oxendine, 187 N. C. 658, 122 S. E. 568
(1924) ; see Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 330, 184 AtI. 97, 99 (1936).
5. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863) ; cf. People
v. Garippo et al., 292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75 (1920) ; see Commonwealth v. Mellor, 294
Pa. 339, 342, 144 Atl. 534, 535 (1928).
6. "The phraseology of causation, has never afforded a glimmer of light on any
problem a court has had to decide, nor does it provide the slightest articulation for any
judgments courts have passed. It has served but one useful function, and that has
been to give the judges a dependable way out of difficult situations when they have
made up their minds, but either do not know how, or else do not take the time, to
articulate their conclusions on a rational basis." Green, Are There Dependable Rides
of Cansation? 77 U. oF PA. L. REv. 601, 626 (1929). However, Beale, The Proximate
Consequences of an Act, 33 Ha'v. L. REv. 633 (1920), states that a set of dependable
rules of causation exist which will solve all tort and criminal problems.
7. ". . . no one is responsible for what others with whom he is not allied do or
bring about." HALL, GENERAL PaIcnIs OF CRImiNAL LAW, 261 (1947). While
useful for determining who are parties to a crime, this principle is not helpful in de-
termining whether causation exists.
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were punishable by death.8 It was an easy step to cql1 a homicide com-
mitted in the course of a felony, "murder", as the punishment could be
no greater.9 Distinctions should be maintained which prevent the further
growth of this anachronism. For the same reason, the analogy should be
taken to the "innocent bystander" cases where possible. Although the
deterrent effect of this decision may prove to be very great, and although
the decision might be justified on that ground, the court, by discussing
many tort authorities, 10 hints that a policy reason other than "deterrence"
underlies its decision. The objectives of tort and criminal law are so
divergent,' however, that such precedents cannot be used interchangeably
without causing confusion in both fields of law, with consequent illogical
and undesirable results.
Eminent Domain-Just Compensation for Government Seizure of
Strike-Bound Public Utility Is Not Measured by Earnings-Virginia
seized and operated a strike-bound ferry company, under an emergency
statute providing for state seizure until the owner was able to operate again,
and for payment to owners of "reasonable, proper, and lawful compensa-
tion." 1 Pursuant to statutory procedure, owners filed a petition for the
court to determine just compensation. The lower court based its award
on net profits for the period of seizure. On appeal, it was determined
(two of five judges dissenting) that payment should be fair rental value
based on circumstances at the time, including fact that ferry was not operat-
ing due to strike, and hence had no earning power. Anderson v. Chesa-
peake Ferry Co., 43 S. E. 2d 10 (Va. 1947).
It is well settled that just compensation under eminent domain shall
be determined by considering the best use to which the property is suited,
and by avoiding any element of forced sale.2 The court's consideration
of the temporary lack of earning power resulting from the strike was a
manifest departure from this rule, since when the test is applied the
ferry's value as a going concern would seem to be the proper measure
of compensation. In determining just compensation for a temporary tak-
8. "... this continued to be the law of the land as to treason and as to all felo-
nies, except petty larceny and mayhem, down to the year 1826, subject to the singular
and intricate exceptions introduced by the law relating to the benefit of clergy." 1
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 458 (1883).
9. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 413, 61 S. W. 735, 741 (1901); 3
STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 75 (1883).
10. "There is no reason why the principle underlying the doctrine of proximate
cause . . . in the three civil cases just cited should not apply to criminal cases also.
Chief Justice DE GREY, in the Squib case, . . . showed that he regarded the analogy
between civil and criminal cases in which individuals are injured or killed as being
so close that the principle of proximate cause applied to both classes of cases." In-
stant case at 198, 53 A. 2d at 745.
11. It is usually said that the function of tort law is compensation for loss, while
the purpose of criminal law is mainly to discourage criminal activity. If compensa-
tion for loss were an objective of criminal law, the policy behind criminal law would
be vengeance.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 2072(33) (Michie, Supp. 1946).
2. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1933) ("just consideration of all
the uses for which it is suitable") ; Waukesha Gas and Electric Co. v. R. R. Commis-
sion, 181 Wis. 281, 194 N. W. 846 (1923), involving a public utility ("considering the
property as a going business entity"). See also Steiner, Eminent Domain Damages,
6 Mo. L. Rxv. 166, 170 and n. 30 (1941).
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ing, as distinguished from the usual permanent seizure under eminent
domain, the measure is generally held to be a "fair rental value." 3 In
the public utility field, however, there is no active renting market, and
courts avoid discussing formulae for determination of rental value of a
public utility.4 Furthermore, no just compensation cases were found in-
volving a strike.5
There is thus no reason why the court could not have considered the
strike element as the leading factor affecting rental value, instead of treat-
ing it secondarily. As a prerequisite to such treatment, the policy of the
statute could be established by legislative history. This policy was to de-
termine the compensation in such manner that neither disputant would reap
advantage from government seizure 6 and so that incentive would be given
to both to settle the strike, minimizing government control. Such a test
is difficult to apply since if, as in the instant case, the determination of
rental value is on the basis of temporary inability to earn, a bargaining
advantage is accorded to labor, which continues to receive wages while
management's return is negligible. On the other hand, if net profits is
the measure of remuneration,7 management receives an advantage, for
under the Virginia statute it would achieve normal profits, since it con-
tinues managing subject only to nominal control by the Highway Commis-
sioner, while labor may not strike and must work at pre-strike conditions.
In the federal seizures, where net profits were remitted, recommendations
of the War Labor Board on labor's demands were placed in effect during
government control.8  But here again labor gets an advantage for granted
demands are deducted from income before management receives profits.9
Perhaps the solution lies between these extremes in a rental value wherein
management secures a percentage of net profits, 10 and labor's demands re-
main unsettled during seizure. No bargaining advantage is bestowed on
3. Egan v. Philadelphia, 108 Pa. Super. 271, 164 AtI. 813 (1933); Johnson v.
United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 391 (1866). Some other definitions are: United States v.
Certain Parcels of Land, 63 F. Supp. 175 (1945) (what the property is fairly worth
for the time held) ; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 327
(1892) (a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304 (1922) (the owner shall be put in as good
position pecuniarily as if his property has not been taken) ; Olson v. United States,
mpra note 2 (he must be made whole but is not entitled to more) ; Louisville and
N. R. R. v. De Montluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854 (1928) (fair value between
one wanting to sell and one wanting to buy).
4. See ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 617-33 (1936) and cases
cited therein.
5. Even in such federal seizures as the oil refineries, EXEC. ORDER 9540, 9564,
9565, 9577A; meat packers, ExEc. ORDER 9685; N. Y. tugboats, EXEC. ORDER 9693;
there was apparently no such litigation, probably because net profits were turned over
to owners. Vietheer, The Government Seizure Stratagem in Labor Disputes, 6 PuB.
ADMIN. REv. 149, 154 (1946).
6. The governor's message asking for passage of the bill, and the arguments of
the legislators all were accompanied by an express denial of any attempt to be partial
in the labor dispute in any differences which might then or later exist. Parker, Cur-
rent Trends in Labor Law in Virginia, 32 VA. L. Rxv. 1050, 1060 (1946).
7. See dissenting opinion in instant case at p. 17.
8. 54 STAT. 892. 50 U. S. C. App. 309 (1940) as amended 57 STAT. 165 (1943), 50
U. S. C. App. § 1505 (Supp. 1944).
9. If demands are not granted, the result is the same as merely giving owners net
profits.
10. Virginia now has such a statute, providing that 15% of net profits, deter-
mined by a stated formula, shall go to the state as compensation for operation. VA.
ACTS 1947, c. 9, § 12. The amount or percentage may vary, and need not definitely
be fixed by the legislature. Indeed fixing by the legislature may be unconstitutional. See
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LABOR LEGISLATION IN THE PUBLIC UTILITY
FIELD, A. B. A. Section of Public Utility Law 1946-47, at p. 12.
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either, and an incentive to settle is presented to both," tending to minimize
government control.1 2 This may raise the question, however, whether loss
of normal profits would equalize loss of the right to strike. The instant
decision, in failing to adjudge the strike factor, thereby awards advan-
tage to labor, and is a doubtful precedent for handling the problem.
Income Taxation-Donor of Income-Producing Property Subject
to Tax on Accrued Income at Date of Gift-In 1940 the payee of a note
gave it to her self-sufficient adult children. The maker's net worth as-
sured payment of the principal ($71,000) and accrued interest ($43,000).
$40,000 accrued interest was paid the donees in 1940, the remaining $3,000
in 1941. The donor paid a gift tax for 1940 based on $114,000. In
addition, the Commissioner assessed the donor a $43,000 income tax
deficiency for 1940, based on the unreported accrued interest on the note.
The Tax Court held her liable for income tax in 1940 for the $40,000
accrued interest paid the donees that year, but not liable for the $3,000
paid in 1941. On appeal, this decision was affirmed. Income is taxable to
the one who earns and controls its disposition regardless of whether he
receives the actual payment himself or exercises his power to procure
its payment to another. Austin v. Conm'r, 161 F. 2d 666 (C. C. A. 6th,
1947).
This decision is an extension of the principle crystalized in Helvering
v. Horst: "The dominant purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of
income to those who earn or otherwise create the right to receive it and
enjoy the benefit of it when paid."' Heretofore, the application of this
principle has been limited when the owner has irrevocably divested him-
self of all control over the income-producing property.2  But here the act
of giving away this property was such an exercise of control over the
accrued interest thereon as to amount to the enjoyment of it,3 thus mak-
ing it taxable as income to the donor when paid to the donee.4 That
enjoyment to a taxpayer on a cash basis is the nebulous mental satis-
faction derived from a gift of such property represents a great diversion
11. Labor's incentive to settle is the fact they obtain no demands during govern-
ment operation but must continue under objectional pre-strike conditions. But see
Id. at 14, in which it is contended labor has no incentive because they receive wages.
12. If, instead of net profits to deduct from, there is a loss during government
operation, although loss is unusual in public utilities, another problem is posed. The
possibility of a charge for government operation presents itself, as analogous to a per-
centage of net profits, but may be unconstitutional as a penalty.
1. 311 U. S. 112 (1940). During the past two decades the Supreme Court has
evolved and extended the application of this principle. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312
U. S. 579 (1941) (beneficiary of trust taxed although trust income was paid to short-
term assignees) ; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940) (agent taxed for re-
newal commissions paid by insurance company to his assignee) ; Burnet v. Wells, 289
U. S. 670 (1933) (settlor of irrevocable trust taxed for trust income used to pay his
obligations) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930) (settlor taxed for income from
a revocable trust) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930) (assignor taxed for assigned
earnings). MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME § 12 (rev. ed. 1945) ; 39 MicEE. L. REv. 495
(1941).
2. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S. 5 (1937) ; Comm'r v. Giannini, 129 F. 2d 638 (C.
C. A. 9th 1942) ; cf. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940) ; Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U. S. 376 (1930).
3. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 115, 118 (1940).
4. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579, 583 (1941). But see Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 343 (1940) (dissenting opinion).
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from the original concept of enjoyment and realization.5 Nevertheless,
this concept is applied today,6 possibly because of Congressional acqui-
escence in the Supreme Court's rulings 7 on the overall problem of taxing
the owner of the tree on which the fruit grew.
Attempts may be made to apply this concept of enjoyment and reali-
zation to numerous situations,6 causing difficulty in keeping it within
rational limits. While it could allow great leeway to tax authorities to tax
the donor for income on bona fide gifts, such a result is not likely for
the limitation of rationality has not been exceeded in the related field of
assignment of income or income-producing property.9 Mathematically
the amount of current income accrued as of the date of a gift of income-
producing property is easily determined,1 0 and except in certain types of
factual situations,"1 would ". . . not broaden the definition of income to
an indefinite extent to include purely intangible satisfactions," 12 even when
the donor is taxed for the accrued interest in whatever year it is paid the
donee.' 3 This application of the concept is consistetit with the inclusion
of accrued interest in a taxpayer's earned income upon his death,1 4 and
with the method of calculating income earned upon the transfer of install-
ment obligations; 15 further, the same amount of accrued interest is taxed
as income as is taxed as a gift,' 6 as evidenced in the immediate case where
the donor paid a gift tax based on $114,000. This concept is also in
accord with the laymen's understanding that the present value of interest-
bearing assets is the face amount plus interest accrued to date. By placing
the holding of the principal case beside those of other cases in related
5. See Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U. S. 204, 211 (1925) (enjoyment and realiza-
tion occurs when the income is received by the taxpayer). MAGILL, TAxABLE IxcomE
§5 at 175 (rev. ed. 1945).
6. Cases cited note 1 mipra; note 13 infra.
7. MAGILL, THE ImPAcr OF FEDERAL TAxEs § 2 at 49 (1943).
8. John H. Kellogg, 2 T. C. 1126 (1943) (voluntary, gratuitous relinquishment
of salary credited to taxpayer's account is not realization of income) ; accord, Comm'r
v. Giannini, 129 F. 2d 638 (C. C. A. 9th 1942).
9. Short term trust: Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940). Assigned trust
income: Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941) ; cf. Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U. S.
5 (1937). Assigned partnership earnings: Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932) ;
cf. Humphreys v. Commr, 88 F. 2d 430 (C. C. A. 2d 1933). Cases cited note 1 supra.
MAGILL, TAXABLE IwcoME § 8 (rev. ed. 1945); MAGILL, THE ImpAcT OF FEDERAL
TAxEs § 6 at 182-189 (1943).
10. MAGILL, THE IMPAcT OF FEDzA TAxEs § 2 at 55 (1943).
11. Comm'r v. Timken, 141 F. 2d 625 (C. C. A. 6th 1944) (donor of note and
accrued interest held not taxable for interest paid donee because at time of gift the
financial condition of maker gave little likelihood of payment of either principal or
interest) ; accord, First State Bank of Stratford, 8 T. C. -, No. 92, CCH TAx CoURT
SERv. U 15,723 (1947).
12. MAGiLL, THE fMPACT OF FEDERAL TAxEs § 2 at 55 (1943).
13. Bertha May Holmes, 1 T. C. 508 (1943) (donor of building and loan shares
taxed for dividends paid donee which had accrued prior to date of gift); Leonard
Marx, 39 B. T. A. 537 (1939); I. T. 3011, XV-2 Cum. BULL. 132 (1936) (settlor
taxed for accrued interest on bonds irrevocably transferred to trust fund in the year
such interest is collectible by the trustee) ; accord, Potter v. Fahs, 71 F. Supp. 675
(S. D. Fla. 1947) ; cf. Annie A. Colby, 45 B. T. A. 536 (1941) (by implication).
14. 48 STAT. 694 (1934), as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 42(a) (Supp. 1946).
15. 44 STAT. 805 (1928), as amended, 26 U. S. C. §44(d) (1940).
16. 47 STAT. 248 (1932), as amended, 53 STAT. 148 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 1005
(1940).
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fields,17 many loopholes which otherwise afford opportunity for tax avoid-
ance of the revenue laws will be effectively closed.'
8
Income Taxation-Disallowance of Deduction for Loss Deter-
mined by Indirect Intra-Family Sale-Husband managed the inde-
pendent estate of his wife. On several occasions he ordered a broker to sell
certain stocks for the account of either himself or his wife, and to pur-
chase an equal number of shares for the other at as nearly the same price
as possible, for the acknowledged purpose of establishing deductible losses.
The transactions were executed through the stock exchange so that on
each occasion the sale or purchase was to an unknown buyer or from an
unidentified seller, and invariably the buying spouse received different
stock certificates from those relinquished by the other. Husband and
wife's estate filed separate returns claiming losses on the sales described.
These deductions were disallowed by the commissioner on the ground that
the transactions constituted indirect family sales under § 24 (b) of the
Internal Revenue Code.' The Tax Court held § 24 (b) inapplicable. 2
When the Sixth Circuit Court reversed,3 thereby reaching a result con-
trary to that of the Second Circuit Court,4 the Supreme Court granted
certiorari and held that § 24 (b) comprehends the transfer of different
units of fungibles from one member of a family to another independently
of the manner in which the transfer is accomplished, thus disallowing the
deduction. McWilliams v. Commissioner, 67 Sup. Ct. 1477 (1947).
The difficulty of interpreting § 24 (b) is highlighted by the fact that
the Second Circuit Court, citing the very same congressional expressions 5
as did the Supreme Court, found no reason to suppose that Congress in-
tended to cover the instant situation within the term "indirect sale." 6
Yet the Supreme Court concluded that the purpose of the section was to
disallow deductions for technical losses at times selected by the taxpayer
when, practically speaking, the investment continued uninterrupted, re-
jecting the contention that the purpose of § 24 (b) and its forerunners 
7
was merely to do away with the evidentiary problem peculiar to the
intra-family sale. Prior to 1934, the test of whether there was a deductible
17. Cases cited notes 1 and 9 supra.
18. See Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U. S. 280 (1946) ; Doyle v. Comm'r, 147 F. 2d
769, 773 (C. C. A. 4th 1945) ; Jacob DeKorse, 5 T. C. 94, 101 (1945). MAGILL, TAX-
ABLE Ixco E § 8 at 281, 287, 288 (rev. ed. 1945) ; MAGiLL, Tnx IMPACT OF FEDERAL
TAXES § 2 at 54 (1943).
1. 53 STAT. 16 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 24(b) (1) (1940). "In computing net income
no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of losses from sales or exchanges
of property, directly or indirectly . . . Between members of a family. . . . in-
cluding ". . . only his brothers and sisters (whether by the whole or half blood),
spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants," id. § (2) (D).
2. 5 T. C. 623 (1945). In so doing, the Tax Court followed its own decision, 45
B. T. A. 478 (1941), and that of the Second Circuit Court, 132 F. 2d 660 (C. C. A. 2d
1943), in Commissioner v. Ickelheimer.
3. 158 F. 2d 637 (C. C. A. 6th 1946), following Commissioner v. Kohn, 158 F. 2d
32 (C. C. A. 4th 1946).
4. Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, note 2 supra.
5. 78 CONG. REc. 2662 (1934), 81 CONG. REc. 9019 (1937).
6. Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, note 2 supra at 661. The problem of what con-
stitutes an indirect sale under § 24(b) had not been raised before the courts prior to
the Board of Tax Appeals' consideration of the question in the Ickelheimer case.
7. The provision was first enacted in 1934, 48 STAT. 691, 26 U. S. C. § 24(a) (6)
(1934).
loss on a sale was one of bona ides,8 and the government was hampered
by the fact that the evidence material to the question was, by the very
nature of the relationship of the parties, frequently inaccessible to the gov-
ernment.9 But the Supreme Court in denying that the congressional in-
tent was so limited as to exclude the present situation, was consistent with
its reasoning in the Clifford '0 and Gregory 11 cases, where they had re-
fused to permit tax reduction by devious, though not prohibited means.
There, also, the sole reason for the transactions in question was the avoid-
ance of tax with no resulting economic loss to the taxpayer.
Here, however, the Court goes further than in the above mentioned
decisions, and further than the facts of this case require, declaring that
even if the purchase and sale by family members were at arms length
or fortuitous, no tax avoidance motive being present, the loss would still
not be deductible, since § 24 (b) states an absolute prohibition.', The
decision, thereby, introduces a new factor for the mutual consideration
of independent family members who trade upon organized security and
commodity markets; the possibility of causing disallowance of an other-
wise deductible loss to another member of the family.'3 The Court refers
to, but leaves unanswered, the question as to what time interval between
the sale and purchase by family members would serve to divorce the
one from the other. Since by § 118,14 a taxpayer, who has sold property,
is permitted to repurchase for himself after thirty days and deduct his
loss on the sale, it would be incongruous to refuse the same deduction to
the seller if a member of his family should purchase after a like period.
But if the purchase is within thirty days, the loss will likely be held
not deductible on analogy to § 118. Further, this decision invites the
interesting question of whether there is an "indirect" family sale when one
family member purchases before the other family member sells. In view
of the conflicting decision of the Tax Court in this case, and because the
Tax Court "is informed by experience and kept current with tax evolu-
tion and needs by the volume and variety of its work", 15 in the absence
of compelling policy reasons, 16 the interests of the government would appear
to be best served by leaving to that forum the determination of equivocal
tax problems.
8. Zimmerman v. Commissioner, 36 B. T. A. 279 (1937), rev/d on other grounds,
100 F. 2d 1023 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) ; Shoenberg v. Commissioner, 77 F. 2d 446 (C. C.
A. 8th 1935).
9. See Note, 49 YALE L. J. 75 (1939).
10. "Technical considerations, niceties of the law of trust or conveyances, or the
legal paraphernalia which inventive genius may construct as a refuge from surtaxes
should not obstruct the basic issue." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1939).
11. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1934).
12. Instant case at 1480.
13. Everyday transactions on securities exchanges indicates that business reasons
might well dictate one person to sell and another to buy at a given price. Further,
since many issues are heavily traded and securities are generally bought and sold in
units of one hundred, the chance of occurrence of such fortuitous situations is more
than remote.
14. 53 STAT. 53 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 118 (1940).
15. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 502 (1943).
16. The argument, frequently made, that broad construction of fiscal legislation
will protect against the loss of revenue has no practical verity. See PAUL, STuDiEs IN
FEDERAL TAXATION 156 (1937). Nor does the argument that liberal construction will
lend flexibility and obviate the necessity of legislative correction carry much weight
for two reasons. First, the Revenue Code must, in any event, be constantly revised
to meet political and economic necessity. There have been fourteen revenue acts since
the first act in 1916. Secondly, flexibility is uncertainty, and therein is the consequent
danger that more harm will be done to innocent taxpayers than the good of avoidance
prevention. Id. 153-157.
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Securities and Exchange Commission-Corporation By-Law May
Not Circumvent Proxy Rules-Stockholder gave notice to the cor-
poration that he intended to submit the following proposals for action at
the stockholders' annual meeting: (1) to have independent auditors elected
by the stockholders; (2) to amend corporate by-law 47 and eliminate the
requirement that notice of the proposed alterations of by-laws be contained
in the notice of meeting; . . .* (4) to require a report of proceedings
at stockholders' meetings sent to all stockholders. Stockholder requested
that management set forth the proposals at length in management's proxy
solicitation material pursuant to SEC Rule X-14A-7.2 Upon the corpora-
tion's refusal to accede to the request, the SEC sought to enjoin the cor-
poration from using the proxies solicited.8 The corporation contended that
management was privileged to refuse to give the requisite notice and thus
exclude each proposal under by-law 47 from being "a proper subject for
action'by security holders" at the annual meeting. The district court de-
cided that management under by-law 47 was not required to give notice
of by-law proposals and hence proposals (2) and (4) could properly be
declared out of order at the meeting.4 On appeal, it was held that all three
proposals are proper subjects for stockholder action within purview of
Rule X-14A-7, and the intent of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
is not to be circumvented by procedural devices of management. Securities
and Exchange Commission v. Transamerica Corporation et al., 16 U. S. L.
WEEK 2129 (C. C. A. 3d, Sept. 15, 1947).
The Securities and Exchange Commission has found it necessary to
resort to litigation in few instances to enforce its proxy rules; in those, the
federal courts have shown a tendency to uphold the commission's interpre-
tation of its own rules.5 The decision in the instant case is in line with
prior proxy regulation trends 6 and upholds the legislative intent by giv-
ing full effect to corporate suffrage.
7 Prior to Rule X-14A-7 a minority
stockholder could oppose the management in a proxy fight
s using Rule
X-14A-6 to require management to mail out his private proxy solicitation
1. Proposal (3) was to change the place of annual meeting and was not ruled on,
the change having been adopted by management.
2. 17 CoDE FED. REGS. § 240.14A-7 (Cum. Supp. 1943). Rule X-14A-7 provides
that when a security holder has given management reasonable notice that he ". . . in-
tends to present for action by the security holders . . . a proposal which is a proper
subject for action by the security holders, the management shall set forth the pro-
posal and provide means by which security holders can . . ." vote on it.
3. 48 STAT. 881, 895 (1934), 15 U. S. C. § 78n., "(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to solicit . . . any proxy . . . in respect of any security . . .
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
4. The district court designated the auditor proposal "a mandate from the stock-
holders" rather than a by-law proposal and ordered the corporation to set it forth for
a vote. S. E. C. v. Transamerica Corporation et al., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946).
5. For cases involving violation of Commission's rule prohibiting the making of
false and misleading statements in the solicitation of proxies see S. E. C. v. O'Hara
Re-Election (or Proxy) Committee et al., 28 F. Supp. 523 (D. Mass. 1939) ; S. E. C.
v. Okn, 58 F. Supp. 20 (S. D. N. Y. 1944). In general, see S. E. C. v. Associated Gas
and Electric Co. et al., 99 F. 2d 795, 798 (C. C. A. 2d 1938).
6. For articles on regulation of proxy solicitation see Dean, Non-Compliance with
Proxy Regulations, 24 CORi. L. Q. 483 (1939) ; Bernstein and Fischer, The Regula-
tion of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U.
OF CHI. L. REv. 226 (1940); Comment, 33 IrL. L. Rrx. 914 (1939).
7. See H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
8. For an interesting summary of the fight to gain control of Standard Oil of
Indiana, see Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 81-84
(1933).
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material at the stockholder's own expense.9 The effect of the present de-
cision is to enable stockholders to bring their proposals to the attention
of fellow stockholders at the expense of the corporation, provided such
proposals are not prohibited by state law.
Both court and commission acknowledged that the question of what
constituted a proper subject for stockholder action is to be determined by
state law. Although. Delaware law recognized that selection of auditors
and amendment of by-laws were powers to be exercised by management,
it did not prohibit stockholders from exercising the same powers.10 In
addition the Transamerica charter itself provided that stockholders might
alter or repeal by-laws." Note that although a by-law requiring that notice
of proposed amendments be contained in the notice of meeting is very
common and ordinarily beneficial to the stockholders,12 management mis-
used by-law 47 in an arbitrary effort to avoid a vote on proposals it was
unwilling to sanction. The danger that the instant decision will open the
door to a flood of crackpot proposals,' 3 ultimately causing the stockholders
considerable expense, may be obviated by proper commission administra-
tion.' 4  Here the proposals were clearly proper subjects for stockholder
action.' 5 Presumably the commission would not, in close cases, insist that
management set forth a stockholder's proposals.
Taxation-Federal Gift Tax on Property Transfer Made Pursuant
to Divorce Decree-Pursuant to a divorce decree incorporating a
previously made separation agreement, divorced husband transferred
$625,000 to his former wife. The Commissioner assessed a gift tax on
the full amount. The Tax Court held the transfer non-taxable in a split
decision. The Commissioner petitioned for review, but claimed as taxable
only that part of the transfer in excess of wife's actual support needs.
The Circuit Court affirmed, holding the transfer made in payment of a
judgment, not a gift. Commissioner v. E. C. Converse, 163 F. 2d 131
(C. A. A. 2d, 1947).
Although any transfer made for less than adequate consideration in
money or money's worth could be deemed a gift under the wording of
9. 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 240.14A-6 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
10. DEL. CoRP. LAw ANN. § 9 says in part: "The business of every corporation
organized under the provisions of this chapter shall be managed by a Board of Di-
rectors, except as hereinafter or in its Certificate of Incorporation otherwise pro-
vided." § 12 provides: "The original by-laws of a corporation may be adopted by the
incorporators. Thereafter, the power to make, alter or repeal by-laws shall be in the
stockholders, but any corporation may, in the certificate of incorporation, confer that
power upon the directors."
11. S. E. C. v. Transamerica Corporation et aL., sutra note 4, at 330.
12. Courts have uniformly sustained the validity of by-law provisions making
notice a prerequisite to amendment or alteration of by-laws. State v. Offutt, 121 Neb.
76, 236 N. W. 174 (1931) ; Klein v. Scranton Life Insurance Co., 139 Pa. Super. 369,
11 A. 2d 770 (1940) ; 5 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (Perm. ed.) 49; 8 id.
685 et seq.
13. See discussion in S. E. C. v. Transamerica Corporation et aL, cited mipra note
4, at 332.
14. See 12 FED. REG. 6788, §240.14A-8(c) (1947) (Proposed change in Proxy
Rule).
15. The Commission's brief at 42-43 indicates that such Delaware corporations
as General Motors Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Standard Brands, Inc.,
and Allied Stores Corporation have submitted to their stockholders the questions
whether auditors should be elected by the stockholders and whether a report of pro-
ceedings at the annual meeting should be sent to the stockholders. See also instant
case at -; district court's opinion, cited supra note 4, at 333.
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the statute,1 Treasury Regulations have excluded business transactions
from the gift category if they are bona fide, at arm's length, and free
from donative intent.2 Intra-family transactions, however, are closely scru-
tinized.8 In a case involving ante-nuptial settlements, the Supreme Court
has said that the test of adequate consideration has replaced the test of
donative intent in ,determining whether a particular transaction is a gift
or not.4 The Tax Court in the principal case in effect held that the
agreement was a bona fide at-arm's-length transaction, arid distinguished
the Wemyss and Merrill 5 cases because these involved ante-nuptial agree-
ments.6 Obviously, a separation agreement is less likely to have a donative
element than an ante-nuptial transaction. It might be argued, however,
that the two Supreme Court cases could not be distinguished, since the
opinions made adequacy of consideration the only test of a non-donative
transfer between husband and wife.7  The present position of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue concedes that the portion of the payment required for
the support of the wife is made for adequate consideration.8 The estate
tax sections of the Internal Revenue Code make a clear distinction between
liabilities incurred through agreement and liabilities imposed by law.9 A
line of cases holds that since the divorce court could have based its decree
on all the evidence, rather than on the agreement alone, a claim based
on a divorce decree incorporating previously made settlements is a lia-
bility imposed by law, and so deductible from decedent's gross estate.10
The decision of the Circuit Court in the principal case is based on these
cases.
If the transfer would not be taxable under the estate tax, it should
not be taxed under the gift tax, because of the supplementary nature of
1. Revenue Act of 1932, § 503, 47 STAT. 247, as amended, 26 U. S. C., § 1002. H.
R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 27 and 29 (1932). SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 39 (1932). U. S. Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.8 (1943).
2. Ibid.
3. "Love and affection, promise of marriage, etc.," are not adequate consideration.
Ibid. Nor is relinquishment of marital rights in husband's property. Merrill v. Fahs,
324 U. S. 308 (1945) ; Comm'r. v. Bristol, 121 F. 2d 129 (C. C. A. 1st 1941).
4. See Comm'r. v. Wemyss, 324 U. S. 303, 306 (1945).
5. Merrill v. Fahs, supra note 3; Comm'r. v. Wemyss, supra note 4.
6. Converse v. Comm'r., 5 T. C. 1014 (1945) (by implication since the court ex-
pressly followed Jones v. Comm'r., 1 T. C. 1207 (1943), in which this position was
taken). The Tax Court has since followed Converse v. Comm'r. in Lahti v. Comm'r.,
6 T. C. 7 (1946) ; Mitchell v. Comm'r., 6 T. C. 159 (1946) ; Est. of J. H. Hill, 5 T.
C. M.-(mem. op.) CCH Dec. 14,974(M); L. C. Ledyard, 5 T. C. M.-(mem. op.)
CCH Dec. 15,087(M). (But note that in the Lahti, Hill and Ledyard cases main em-
phasis is on wife's relinquishment of support rights as adequate consideration; see note
8, infra.)
7. See Converse v. Comm'r., id. at 1017-1019.
8. E. T. 19, 1946-2 Cums. BULL. 166. This bulletin was published subsequent to
the decision of Tax Court in principal case. In this bulletin the Bureau elects
not to stand on a line of cases holding that relinquishment of support rights is not
adequate consideration. Adriance v. Higgins, 113 F. 2d 1013 (C. C. A. 2d 1941);
Meyers Estate v. Comm'r., 110 F. 2d 367 (C. C. A. 2d 1940). But cf. In re Neller's
Est., 356 Pa. 625, 53 A. 2d 122 (1947). 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 124; see dissent by L.
Hand, J., in Meyers Estate, supra this note.
9. Revenue Act of 1932, § 303, 44 STAT. 73, as amended, 26 U. S. C. 812(b)
(1932). H. R. Ryp., supra note 1, p. 48; SEN. REP., supra note 1, p. 51; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, §81.36 (1942).
10. Comm'r. v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (C. C. A. 2d 1946) ; Comm'r. v. State Street
Trust Co., 128 F. 2d 618 (C. C. A. 1st 1942) ; Edith C. Young, Exrx. v. Comm'r., 39
B. T. A. 230 (1939).
RECENT CASES
the latter. 1 The estate tax cases relied upon, however, turn on a dis-
tinction which seems purely formal, inasmuch as there was no evidence
in any of them to show that the decree was based on anything other
than the separation agreement. Nevertheless, if the transaction was ac-
tually bona fide at arm's length, the result does not seem improper, but
it does leave open a small avenue of tax avoidance.12  Extension of the
adequate consideration test to the separation situation would perhaps pro-
vide a contrary result. Nor is there a controlling policy precluding taxa-
tion of such settlements. At first glance, taxation of a property transfer
made pursuant to a divorce decree might seem to be a strange transmuta-
tion of "gift tax," but it would be in accord with the actual expressed
intent of Congress, which was to prevent estate tax avoidance by dis-
couraging depletion of estates during the taxpayer's lifetime.' 3
Trusts-Effect of Subsequent Amendment to Internal Revenue
Code on Tax-Free Gift-Testator provided by will that certain bene-
ficiaries should receive specified sums at regular intervals from a trust,
and that his estate should absorb "all inheritance and/or other taxes im-
posed upon . . . 'trust funds." By prior decree' the annuities were
construed to be a charge upon the trust corpus as well as income. The
federal income tax on the entire trust income was duly paid by the trus-
tees before payments were made to the beneficiaries.2 The Revenue Act
of 1942 shifted to annuitants receiving trust income the liability to pay
income taxes thereon s Thereafter the trustees in filing their income tax
returns deducted 4 from gross income the amount of income distributed
to the beneficiaries who, in turn paid the taxes thereon. The beneficiaries
challenged this action of the trustees, and, on application for instructions,
the court held that the annuities should have been made tax-free according
to the will, and that the trustees must pay for or to beneficiaries the
amounts by which the beneficiaries' income taxes were increased by in-
cluding in their taxable income, the income received from the trustees.
Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Kohl, 54 A. 2d 473 (N. J.,
1947).
11. Merrill v. Fahs, supra note 3; Comm'r. v. Bristol, supra note 3; cf. Sanford's
Estate v. Comm'r., 308 U: S. 39 (1939). Cf. note 13 infra.
12. Since this view is in effect the Tax Court's holding, it might be controlling
under the doctrine of Dobson v. Comm'r., 320 U. S. 489 (1943).
13. H. R. REP. No. 708, supra note 1, pp. 8, 28; SEN. REP. No. 665, suipra note 1,
p. 40.
1. Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Kohl, 131 N. J. Eq. 233, 24 A. 2d 809
(1942).
2. Before 1942 courts ruled that an annuity chargeable upon corpus as well as
income, although paid out of income was not taxable to the annuitant as income.
Burnet, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Whitehouse, 283 U. S. 148 (1931). The
trustees, therefore, were taxed on such income. For a criticism of this rule and of
the application of trust concepts in determining income tax liability, see respectively,
Hess and Guterman, Annuity Trusts and the Federal Income Tax, 55 HARv. L. REv.
329 (1942) ; Fenn, The Present Method of Taxi.q Trust Income: A Criticism and
Proposed Revision, 51 YALE L. J. 1143 (1942).
3. 40 STAT. 1065 (1919), as amended, 26 U. S. C. §22(b) (3) (Supp. 1946) ; INT.
REv. BULL., Part II, pp. 558-562 (1942). The effects of the Act are discussed in a
note in 56 HAu~v. L. REv. 428 (1942).
4. 40 STAT. 1071 (1919), as amended, 26 U. S. C. § 162(b) (Supp. 1946). "There
shall be allowed as an additional deduction in computing the net income of the . . .
trust the amount of income of the . . . trust for its taxable year which is to be dis-
tributed currently . . . to the . . . beneficiaries. . .
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The change in tax liability effected by the Act of 1942 presents new
problems in the administration of trusts where the settlor provides for
tax-free annuities. If trust income should prove to be greater than the
disbursements provided for, then additional amounts distributed to pay
off the income taxes on the annuities, may themselves be subject to taxation
as additional income. 5 There seems to follow an infinite succession of a
tax upon a tax.6 This apparent difficulty, however, may be avoided by
the original payment of an amount, which, when reduced by the payment
of income taxes, equals the specified annuity.7 More serious questions
arise in the construction of wills and irrevocable trusts executed prior to °
1942. Would a testator or settlor intend that payments be tax-free by
reason of the contemporary process of taxing "annuity trust" income to
trustees," or, that they be tax-free notwithstanding unforeseen contingencies
which might possibly cause an unanticipated drain on the corpus? It is
less likely that he intended the present interpretation of his directions
that payments be tax-free where such a construction results in unequal
re-imbursements to different beneficiaries for taxes paid on the same amount
of trust income because of their different tax brackets.9 The courts in
many such cases will be faced with uncertainty, and may have to look
beyond the will or trust instrument. Some courts undoubtedly will be
constrained to deviate from the particular terms in order to secure equi-
table or practical settlements.10 It seems that in the instant case the
testator's purpose was so strongly attested to by the terms of the will
and by prevalent circumstances that the court, notwithstanding changes
in the tax law, properly refrained from digressing from the expressed in-
tention in coming to its decision.
5. Bergan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 80 F. 2d 89 (C. C. A. 2d 1935).
6. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 279 U. S. 716,
731 (1929), where the court refrained from answering the problem of taxing a tax ad
infinitum.
7. This principle has been applied in cases involving inheritance taxes. Bouse v.
Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 26 A. 2d 767 (1942) ; In re Levalley's Estate, 191 Wis. 356, 210
N. W. 941 (1926) ; In re Irwin's Estate, 196 Cal. 366, 237 P. 1074 (1925).
8. See note 2 supra.
9. The issue of inequality of benefit through tax payments was not present in the
instant case, as the beneficiaries acted in common and were in no way hostile to each
other.
10. Hardy v. Bankers Trust Co. of New York, 137 N. J. Eq. 352, 44 A. 2d 839
(1945) ; see Pennington v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 65 N. J. Eq. 11, 22, 23, 55
Atl. 468, 472 (1903) ; RESTATE MENT, TRUSTS § 167 (1935). On the activity of courts
in this kind of situation see Scott, Deviation Front the Terms of a Trust, 44 HAv. L.
REv. 1025, 1027 (1931).
